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empirically important case where marginal costs also di¤er between markets. Di¤erential
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if total output does not, unlike under pure price discrimination. To induce output realloca-
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rm varies its prices but again, unlike under pure price discrimination with no
upward bias in the average price. Due to this price dispersion, di¤erential pricing motivated
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in the hybrid case where both demand elasticities and marginal costs di¤er.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A longstanding question in economics concerns the welfare e¤ects of uniform pricing
by a monopolist compared to third-degree price discrimination charging di¤erent prices to
consumers in separate markets characterized by some exogenous signal about the elasticities
of market demands. Originating with Pigou (1920) and Robinson (1933), the literature was
extended by numerous authors including Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985), Layson (1988),
Schwartz (1990), Malueg (1993), Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010), and Cowan (2012). A
key maintained assumption is that total cost depends only on aggregate output and not on
its allocation across markets. This paper extends that analysis by allowing marginal costs,
as well as demand elasticities, to di¤er between markets.
The assumption that total cost is invariant to the allocation of output ts several clas-
sic examples of price discrimination, such as discounts to students or pensioners for non-
personalized services, or the sale of intellectual-property goods or other low marginal-cost
items to di¤erent geographic markets. But in many situations the costs of service di¤er. For
instance, manufacturers often sell to heterogeneous distributors who perform varying ranges
of wholesale functions that relieve the manufacturers of di¤erent costs. This made it di¢ cult
to distinguish price discrimination from cost-justied discounts under the Robinson-Patman
Act, the main U.S. law governing price discrimination (Schwartz 1986).1 As another ex-
ample, book publishers sell both hardback and paperback editions that may implement
quality-based price discrimination between customer groups but also entail di¤erent mar-
ginal costs.2
Another broad class of examples is add-on pricing. Sellers commonly o¤er a base good
1The Act only prohibits discrimination where it may substantially reduce competition among the pur-
chasers, hence does not apply to nal consumers. But its experience illustrates that price di¤erences char-
acterized as price discrimination often are accompanied by cost di¤erences. The examples discussed next
involve price di¤erences to nal consumers.
2By contrast, there are instances where quality-based price di¤erences clearly entail price discrimination
because the lower-quality imposes higher marginal costs on the seller, as occurs when the lower-quality
products are purposefully damagedversions of the high quality products (McAfee and Deneckere 1996).
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and optional add-on services that can only be consumed in conjunction with the base good
(see, e.g., Ellison 2005). Airlines sell a ticket (the base good) and o¤er costly options such
as booking by phone, checking a bag, or onboard meals and movies; manufacturers sell
a product and o¤er technical support; hotels o¤er a room and extras such as phone ser-
vice.3 Importantly, some consumers take the optional items while others do not. If the
seller charges an all-inclusive price (bundled pricing), this represents uniform pricing across
consumer groups that impose di¤erent costs according to whether they use the add-ons or
not. Moving to unbundled pricing by charging separate prices for the add-ons can imple-
ment cost-based pricing: airline passengers who check a bag and subject the airline to an
additional cost pay a higher total price than those who do not. At the same time, unbun-
dled pricing is often controversial among consumers because the prices for the add-ons may
substantially exceed their incremental costs and be motivated at least in part by demand
di¤erences between the groups add-on pricing may be a form of price discrimination.
To our knowledge, there has been scant analysis of welfare under di¤erential pricing
in the empirically important case where marginal costs di¤er. This paper addresses the
gap. We adopt the standard setting where a monopolist serves two markets under uniform
pricing, demand in each market is independent of price in the other market, and a move
to di¤erential pricing lowers the price in one market and raises it in the other.4 But we
allow di¤erent (though constant) marginal costs of serving each market. In this setting
3Airline revenues from various ad-on charges, known as ancillary fees, have been growing rapidly. For
47 of the worlds largest airlines that collectively account for almost half of airline revenues globally their
ancillary revenues rose from $13.5 bn in 2009 to $22 bn in 2010. Some budget carriers derive more than
one third of their revenues from ancillary revenues (Michaels 2011). Ancillary revenues have continued to
grow, and are projected to reach $36.1 bn in 2012 (BusinessWire.com 2012). Banks also have been imposing
ancillary fees for various services such as cash withdrawals at ATMs, paper statements, and rush delivery
for card replacement (Dash 2012).
4When one market is not served under uniform pricing, allowing discrimination may open up new markets
and could yield a Pareto improvement (Hausman and MacKie-Mason 1988). With both markets served under
uniform pricing, the assumption that discrimination will cause prices to move in opposite directions can fail
if the prot function in at least one of the separate markets is not concave (Nahata et al. 1990, Malueg
1992), or if demand in each market also depends on the price in the other market (Layson 1998).
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di¤erential pricing will increase prot compared to uniform pricing by expanding the rms
pricing options, but the e¤ect on aggregate consumer surplus across the markets and on total
welfare prot plus aggregate consumer surplus is ambiguous a priori. Our focus is on
characterizing broad demand conditions under which cost-based di¤erential pricing benets
consumers and overall welfare and to highlight the contrast with pure price discrimination
di¤erential pricing that is based solely on di¤erent demand elasticities.
A central result in the literature is that pure price discrimination can increase welfare
only if total output rises, since discrimination misallocates a given total output between
markets by inducing consumers to choose quantities at which their marginal valuations di¤er
(Schmalensee 1981; Varian 1985; Schwartz 1990). When marginal costs di¤er, however,
there is a new e¤ect: di¤erential pricing saves cost by reallocating output to lower-cost
markets. Consequently, we show that welfare can easily rise even if total output does not.
Less obviously, di¤erential pricing can increase also consumer surplus without raising total
output. The mechanism is subtle, since the cost savings from output reallocation which
are the source of increased welfare when output does not rise do not benet consumers
directly. Rather, consumers benet because in order to shift output to the lower-cost market
the rm must vary its prices and consumers gain from the resulting price dispersion. This
cost-motivated price dispersion does not entail an upward bias in the weighted-average price
across markets in sharp contrast to pure price discrimination.
We begin our analysis by characterizing the monopolists optimal uniform and di¤erential
prices in Section 2, which also provides bounds on the change in welfare and consumer
surplus due to di¤erential pricing. Section 3 analyzes Pigous (1920) case of linear demands,
extended to allow di¤erent (but constant) marginal costs of serving the markets. Di¤erential
pricing yields the same total output as uniform pricing, hence welfare must fall if costs do
not di¤er (the standard welfare result). By contrast, we show that if markets di¤er only in
their marginal costs of service then di¤erential pricing will increase welfare the cost savings
outweigh the consumption misallocation as well as consumer surplus. In the hybrid case,
di¤erential pricing is benecial if the di¤erence in the demand-elasticity parameter is not
too large relative to the di¤erence in marginal costs (Proposition 1).
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In Section 4 we allow demands in the two markets to have any curvature, but assume
they are proportional to each other thereby having equal elasticities at any common price,
so as to isolate the welfare e¤ects of di¤erential pricing that is purely cost based. Consumer
surplus then rises for a broad class of demand functions: those for which the pass-through
rate from marginal cost to the monopoly price does not increase too fast5 or, equivalently,
the curvature of the inverse demands does not decrease too fast (Proposition 2). (When this
condition is violated, however, di¤erential pricing can reduce consumer surplus.) Overall
welfare is shown to increase for a broader class of demand functions (Proposition 3). We
contrast the conditions in Propositions 2 and 3 with their more stringent counterparts under
pure price discrimination, identied in the comprehensive analyses by Aguirre, Cowan and
Vickers (2010) for overall welfare and by Cowan (2012) for consumer surplus.
Section 5 extends the analysis to general demand functions. We provide su¢ cient con-
ditions on the demand functions for di¤erential pricing to improve consumer welfare (and
hence also total welfare) if the di¤erence in demands is not too large relative to the cost
di¤erences (Proposition 4), as with the hybrid case under linear demands. The basic policy
message is unsurprising but worth reiterating: di¤erential pricing deserves a considerably
more favorable outlook when the price di¤erences are plausibly motivated, wholly or in
part, by cost di¤erences. Section 6 presents the conclusions.
2. PRICING REGIMES AND WELFARE BOUNDS
Consider two markets, H and L, with strictly decreasing demand functions qH (p), qL (p)
and inverse demands pH (q), pL (q) : When not necessary, we omit the superscripts in these
5A non-increasing pass-through rate implies that di¤erential pricing motivated solely by cost di¤erences
will not raise the weighted-average price, and therefore will increase aggregate consumer surplus. Even when
the pass-through rate is increasing so that average price rises, consumer welfare may still increase because
of the benecial price dispersion. Pass-through by rms with market power was rst analyzed by Cournot
(1838). Bulow and Peiderer (1983) identify classes of demand functions with constant pass-through rates,
while Weyl and Fabinger (2012) demonstrate the value of pass-through as an analytical device in numerous
diverse settings.
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functions. The markets can be supplied at constant marginal costs cH and cL.
Denote the prices in the two markets by pH and pL. Prots in the two markets are
i (pi) = (pi   ci) qi (pi) ; for i = H;L;
and i (pi) is assumed to be strictly concave.
Under di¤erential pricing, maximum prot in each market is achieved when pi = pi ;
where pi satises
i0 = qi (pi ) + (p

i   ci) qi0 (pi ) = 0:
We assume pH > p

L: In Robinsons (1933) taxonomy, H is the strongmarket while L is
the weak(though we allow the prices to di¤er also for cost reasons).
If the rm is constrained to charge a uniform price, we assume parameter values are such
that both markets will be served (obtain positive outputs) at the optimal uniform price p;
which solves
H0 (p) + L0 (p) = 0:
The strict concavity of i (p) and pH > p

L implies that p

H > p > p

L; 
H0 (p) > 0; and
L0 (p) < 0: Let pL = pL  p < 0 and pH = pH  p > 0: Also, let qL  qL (pL) qL (p) 
qL   qL > 0 and qH = qH (pH)  qH (p)  qH   qH < 0:
Aggregate consumer surplus across the two markets, which we take as the measure of
consumer welfare, is
S =
Z 1
pH
qH (x) dx+
Z 1
pL
qL (x) dx; S =
Z 1
p
qH (x) dx+
Z 1
p
qL (x) dx
under di¤erential and uniform pricing, respectively. The change in consumer surplus due
to di¤erential pricing is
S  S   S =
Z p
pL
qL (x) dx 
Z pH
p
qH (x) dx; (1)
which, together with pH > p > p

L; pL < 0 and pH > 0; immediately implies the
following lower and upper bounds for S:
 qL (p)pL   qH (p)pH < S <  qL (pL)pL   qH (pH)pH : (2)
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That is, with di¤erential pricing that raises the price in market H and lowers it in market
L, the change in consumer surplus is bounded below by the sum of price changes weighted
by outputs at the original (uniform) price, and is bounded above by the sum of price
changes weighted by outputs at the new (di¤erential) prices. The result below, which
follows immediately from (2), provides su¢ cient conditions for di¤erential pricing to raise
or lower aggregate consumer surplus:
Lemma 1 (i) S > 0 if qL (p)pL + qH (p)pH  0; and (ii) S < 0 if qL (pL)pL +
qH (pH)pH  0:
The intuition for part (i) can be visualized by starting with the case qL (p)pL +
qH (p)pH = 0. If both demand curves were vertical at the initial quantities, consumers
gain in market L would exactly o¤set the loss in market H. Since demands are downward-
sloping, however, consumers in L gain more than qL (p)pL by increasing the quantity
purchased while consumers in H mitigate their loss by decreasing their quantity. Both of
these quantity adjustments imply S > 0. If qL (p)pL + qH (p)pH < 0, then S > 0
even before considering the quantity adjustments. A similar argument explains part (ii),
because if the price changes are weighted by the new quantities, qL (pL)pL will overstate
the gain in L while qH (pH)pH will understate the loss in H.
Recalling thatpL = pL p andpH = pH p; the condition in Lemma 1(i) for consumer
surplus to rise also can be expressed as
S > 0 if

qL
qL + qH

pL +

qH
qL + qH

pH  p: (3)
That is, di¤erential pricing raises aggregate consumer surplus across the two markets if the
average of the new prices weighted by each markets share of the initial total output is
no higher than the initial uniform price. This formulation highlights an important princi-
ple: Increased price dispersion that does not raise the weighted average price will benet
consumers overall, because they can advantageously adjust quantities by purchasing more
where price falls and less where price rises.
Now consider total welfare, the sum of consumer surplus and prot: W = S + : Since
di¤erential pricing increases prot (by expanding the rms pricing options) total welfare
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must rise if consumer surplus does not fall, but if consumer surplus falls the change in
welfare is ambiguous. It will be useful also to analyze welfare directly without calculating
prot and consumer surplus. Under di¤erential pricing
W  =
Z qL
0

pL (q)  cL

dq +
Z qH
0

pH (q)  cH

dq: (4)
Welfare under uniform pricing, W; is obtained by replacing qL and q

H in W
 with qL and
qH . The change in total welfare from moving to di¤erential pricing is
W =W   W =
Z qL
qL

pL (q)  cL

dq +
Z qH
qH

pH (q)  cH

dq; (5)
which, together with qL = qL   qL > 0 and qH = qH   qH < 0; immediately implies the
following lower and upper bounds for W :
(pL   cL)qL + (pH   cH)qH < W < (p  cL)qL + (p  cH)qH : (6)
That is, the change in welfare is bounded below by the weighted sum of the output changes,
using the markups at the new (di¤erential) prices as weights; and it is bounded above also by
the weighted sum of output changes, but using instead the markups at the original (uniform)
price as weights.6 From (6), we immediately have the following su¢ cient conditions for
di¤erential pricing to raise or lower total welfare:
Lemma 2 (i) W > 0 if (pL   cL)qL + (pH   cH)qH  0; and (ii) W < 0 if
(p  cL)qL + (p  cH)qH  0:
As with Lemma 1, these results arise because demands are negatively sloped. In market L
the average value to consumers of the output expansionqL is below old uniform price p and
above the new lower price pL; while in market H the average value of the output reduction
qH is above p and below the new higher price pH . Thus, (p

L   cL)qL understates the
welfare gain in market L and (pH   cH)qH overstates the loss in H, so welfare must
rise if the sum of these terms is weakly positive (result (i)). Similarly, (ii) holds because
6Varian (1985) provides a similar expression for the case where marginal costs are equal.
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(p  cL)qL overstates the gain in market L while (p  cH)qH understates the loss in
market H.
The insight from the literature on price discrimination, that price discrimination reduces
total welfare if total output does not increase, obtains as a special case of Lemma 2(ii)
when cH = cL. When costs di¤er (cL < cH), part (i) of Lemma 2 implies:
Remark 1 If di¤erential pricing does not reduce total output compared to uniform pricing,
then total welfare increases if the price-cost markup under di¤erential pricing is weakly
greater in the lower-cost than in the higher-cost market (pL   cL  pH   cH).
Intuitively, the absolute price-cost margin (i.e., the marginal social value of output) under
uniform pricing is higher in the lower-cost market L than in H (p  cL > p  cH), so welfare
can be increased by reallocating some output to market L. Di¤erential pricing induces such
a reallocation, and if the margin in L remains no lower than inH then the entire reallocation
is benecial, hence welfare must increase if total output does not fall (qL   qH).
To highlight the roles of output reallocation versus the change in total output, we use the
mean value theorem to rewrite (5) as
W =

pL (L)  cL

qL +

pH (H)  cH

qH ;
where L 2 (qL; qL) and H 2 (qH ; qH) are constants, with pL (L) < p and pH (H) > p
representing the average willingness to pay in market L and market H, respectively: Let
q  qL + qH : Then, with qH = q  qL; we have the following decomposition of
the welfare change due to di¤erential pricing:
W =

pL (L)  pH (H)

qL| {z }
consumption misallocation
+ (cH   cL)qL| {z }
cost saving
+

pH (H)  cH

q| {z }
output e¤ect
; (7)
where the rst term represents the reduction in consumerstotal value due to reallocating
output between markets starting at the e¢ cient allocation under uniform pricing, the second
term represents the cost savings from the same output reallocation to the lower-cost market,
and the last term is the welfare e¤ect due to the change in total output (which takes the
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sign of q since price exceeds marginal cost).7
We can combine the rst two terms in (7) and call it the (output) reallocation e¤ect, as
opposed to the (change in) output e¤ect:
W =

(pL (L)  cL)  (pH (H)  cH)

qL| {z }
reallocation e¤ect
+

pH (H)  cH

q| {z }
output e¤ect
: (8)
When output does not decrease (q  0), di¤erential pricing increases welfare if the average
value net of cost of the reallocated output is higher in market L: pL (L) cL > pH (H) cH :
This is a weaker condition than pL   cL  pH   cH in Remark 1 (since pL (L) > pL and
pH (H) > p

H),
8 but the latter condition may be more observable.
3. LINEAR DEMANDS
The case of linear demands highlights a sharp contrast between the welfare e¤ects of price
discrimination versus cost-based di¤erential pricing. Relative to uniform pricing, pure price
discrimination lowers consumer surplus and total welfare, whereas di¤erential pricing that
is motivated solely by cost di¤erences will raise both.
Suppose that
pi (q) = ai   biq; where ai > ci for i = H;L:
Then, under di¤erential pricing,
pi =
ai + ci
2
; qi =
ai   ci
2bi
; i =
(ai   ci)2
4bi
;
and pH > p

L requires that (aH   aL) + (cH   cL) > 0: Under uniform pricing, provided
7Alternatively, one can use the output change in market H and write W =

pL (L)  pH (H)

qH
+(cH   cL)qH +

pL (L)  cL

q. Our decompositions are similar in spirit to expression (3) of Aguirre,
Cowan and Vickers (2010), except that they consider innitesimal changes in the allowable price di¤erence
and assume no cost savings.
8The average value to consumers of the reallocated output exceeds pL in market L since output there
rises and is less than pH in market H since output falls. The condition in Remark 1 is therefore su¢ cient
but not necessary for the output reallocation to be benecial.
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that both markets are served:
p =
(aH + cH) bL + (aL + cL) bH
2 (bL + bH)
; qi =
1
bi

ai   (aH + cH) bL + (aL + cL) bH
2 (bL + bH)

:
It follows that
qH   qH =  
aH   aL + cH   cL
2 (bH + bL)
< 0; qL   qL =
aH   aL + cH   cL
2 (bH + bL)
> 0;
and (qH + q

L) (qH + qL) = 0. Pigou (1920) proved this equal outputs result when marginal
cost depends only on the level of total output and not its allocation between markets. We
showed that the result holds also when markets have di¤erent but constant marginal costs
of serving them:
Remark 2 If both markets have linear demands, constant but possibly di¤erent marginal
costs, and would be served under uniform pricing, then total output will be the same under
uniform or di¤erential pricing.
We now can readily compare the change in welfare moving from uniform to di¤erential
pricing in two polar cases: (i) the pure price discrimination scenario where demand elastic-
ities di¤er but costs are equal (aH > aL; but cH = cL), versus (ii) equal demand elasticities
but di¤erent costs (aH = aL; but cH > cL).9
Total Welfare. Since di¤erential pricing leaves total output unchanged, the change in
welfare is determined by the reallocation e¤ect. When only demand elasticities di¤er,
the reallocation e¤ect is harmful since uniform pricing allocates output optimally while
di¤erential pricing misallocates consumption (see (7)). When only costs di¤er, uniform
pricing misallocates output by under-supplying the lower-cost market L where the price-
cost margin is higher (p   cL > p   cH). Di¤erential pricing reallocates output to market
L; and with linear demands the margin remains higher in market L also at the di¤erential
prices (pL cL = (a cL)=2 > (a cH)=2 = pH cH), implying from Remark 1 that welfare
rises.
9Recall that with linear demand, the demand elasticity in market i equals p=(ai p), hence depends only
on the vertical intercept and not the slope.
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Consumer Surplus. When only demand elasticities di¤er (i.e., aH > aL but cL = cH);
moving to di¤erential pricing causes the sum of the price changes weighted by the new
outputs to be positive,
qL (pL)pL + q
H (pH)pH =  
(aH   aL) (aL   aH)
4 (bH + bL)
> 0:
So from Lemma 1(ii), consumer surplus falls. By contrast, when only costs di¤er (aH = aL;
but cH > cL),
qH (p)pH + q
L (p)pL =
(aL   cH   aH + cL) (aL   aH)
2 (bH + bL)
= 0;
so by Lemma 1(i), consumer surplus rises: the sum of the price changes weighted by the
initial outputs is zero, hence the weighted average price equals the initial uniform price and
consumers gain due to the price dispersion (recall (3)).
In the general case where both demand elasticities and costs may di¤er, from (1):
S =
(aH   aL + cH   cL) [(cH   cL)  3 (aH   aL)]
8 (bH + bL)
:
It follows that
S > 0 if aH   aL < cH   cL
3
; and S < 0 if aH   aL > cH   cL
3
: (9)
Furthermore, since
 =
(aH   cH)2
4bH
+
(aL   cL)2
4bL
   (p) = (aH   aL + cH   cL)
2
4 (bH + bL)
;
we have
W = S + =
(aH   aL + cH   cL) [3 (cH   cL)  (aH   aL)]
8 (bH + bL)
:
Thus,
W > 0 if aH   aL < 3(cH   cL); and W < 0 if aH   aL > 3(cH   cL): (10)
Letting ai denote the choke price in market i (the vertical intercept of the demand
curve), we summarize the above results as follows:
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Proposition 1 If both markets have linear demands, a move from uniform pricing to dif-
ferential pricing has the following e¤ects. (i) Total welfare increases (decreases) if the di¤er-
ence between markets in their choke prices is lower (higher) than three times the di¤erence
in costs (aH   aL < (>) 3 (cH   cL)):(ii) Consumer surplus increases (decreases) if the dif-
ference in choke prices is lower (higher) than one third of the cost di¤erence (aH aL < (>)
cH cL
3 ).
Therefore, di¤erential pricing is benecial when the di¤erence in demand elasticities
(which motivates third-degree price discrimination) is not too large relative to the dif-
ference in costs. The condition for welfare to rise is less stringent than for consumer surplus
to rise, since di¤erential pricing increases prot, so S  0 implies W > 0 but not vice
versa.10
4. EQUALLY ELASTIC DEMANDS
This section and the next extend the analysis beyond linear demand functions. For
constant marginal cost c; the monopolists prot under demand q (p) is  = q [p (q)  c] : The
monopoly price p (c) satises p (q)+ qp0 (q)  c = 0: It will be useful for later analysis to let
 (p) =  pq0 (p) =q be the price elasticity of demand (in absolute value); let q = q (p (c)) ;
and let  =  pq00 (p) =q0 (p) and  =  qp00 (q) =p0 (q) be the curvatures (i.e., the elasticity of
the slopes) of direct and inverse demand functions, respectively, where   :
The pass-through rate from marginal cost to the monopoly price also will prove useful.
As noted by Bulow and Peiderer (1983), the pass-through rate equals the ratio of the slope
of inverse demand to that of marginal revenue. Thus,
10The specic condition for welfare to rise, aH aL < 3(cH cL); implies that the gap in margins between
market H and L under di¤erential pricing, (pH   cH)   (pL   cL); is less than under uniform pricing,
(p   cL)   (p   cH) = cH   cL. This requires the output reallocation to market H not to be so large as to
create a greater (but opposite) discrepancy in price-cost margins than under uniform pricing. The condition
for consumer surplus to rise, aH  aL < (cH   cL)=3; can be shown to imply that the weighted-average price
under di¤erential pricing is not su¢ ciently higher than the uniform price to outweigh consumersgain from
the price dispersion.
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p0 (c) =
p0 (q)
2p0 (q) + qp00 (q)
=
1
2   (q) > 0; (11)
where we maintain the standard assumption that the marginal revenue curve is downward-
slopping, so that 2p0 (q) + qp00 (q) < 0 and hence 2   (q) > 0: Thus,
p00 (c) =
0 (q)
[2   (q)]2 q
0 (p) p0 (c)  0 (12)
if and only if
0 (q)  0: (13)
That is, the pass-through rate from marginal cost to the monopoly price will be non-
increasing in marginal cost if and only if the curvature of the inverse demand is not de-
creasing in output (inverse demand is not less convex or more concave at higher q).
The curvature  is non-decreasing for many common demand functions, including those
that display constant pass-through rates (Bulow and Peiderer, 1983): (i) p = a   bq for
 > 0; which reduces to linear demand if  = 1, and whose pass-through rate is p0 (c) =
1= (1 + ) 2 (0; 1); (ii) constant-elasticity demand functions p = q 1= for  > 0;  > 1,
hence p0 (c) = = (   1) > 1; and (iii) p = a  b ln q for a; b > 0 and q < exp (a=b) ; which
reduces to exponential demand (q = e p) if a = 0 and  = 1=b, and whose pass-through
rate is p0 (c) = 1:
To isolate the role of pure cost di¤erences, this section abstracts from price discrimination
incentives by considering demand functions in the two markets that have equal elasticities at
any common price. Equal elasticities require that demands be proportional to each other,
which we express as qL (p) = q (p) and qH (p) = (1  ) q (p) so that qL = 1 qH ; for
 2 (0; 1). A natural interpretation is that all consumers have identical demands q (p) and
 and (1  ) are the shares of all consumers represented by market L and H, respectively.
The function q (p) can take a general form.
With proportional demands the monopolists di¤erential prices are given by the same
function p(c) but evaluated at the di¤erent costs: pL  p(cL), pH  p(cH). Let c 
cL+(1  ) cH . The optimal uniform price p maximizes (p) = (p cL)q(p)+(1  ) (p 
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cH)q(p) = [p  c]q(p). Thus, p  p (c): the monopolist chooses its uniform price as though
its marginal cost in both markets were c, the average of the actual marginal costs weighted
by each markets share of all consumers. It follows that pL+(1  ) pH  p; or di¤erential
pricing does not raise average price for the two market, if p(c) is concave (p00 (c)  0), i.e.,
if the pass-through rate is non-increasing.
Proportional demands further imply that aggregate consumer surplus at any pair of prices
(pL; pH) equals S(pL) + (1  )S(pH), i.e., consumer surplus in each market is obtained
using the common function S(p) derived from the base demand q(p); but evaluated at that
markets price and weighted by its share of consumers. Then, when p(c) is concave (or if
0 (q)  0 from (13)),
S = S (pL) + (1  )S (pH)
> S (pL + (1  ) pH) (since S(p) is convex)
 S (p) (since pL + (1  ) pH  p).
That is, when 0 (q)  0 or the pass-through rate is non-increasing, which ensures that
average price is not higher under di¤erential than under uniform pricing, the price dispersion
caused by di¤erential pricing must raise consumer welfare.
Even if di¤erential pricing raises the average price somewhat, as occurs when 0 (q) < 0
(hence p00 (c) > 0); consumer welfare will still increase due to the gain from price dispersion
if  (q) does not decrease too fast, or
0 (q) >  2   (q)
q
; (A1)
where the right hand side is negative since 2   (q) > 0 from (11).
Proposition 2 Assume qL (p) = q (p) and qH (p) = (1  ) q (p) for  2 (0; 1) : If (A1)
holds, di¤erential pricing increases consumer surplus relative to uniform pricing.
Proof. First, we show that, if and only if (A1) holds, aggregate consumer surplus is a
strictly convex function of constant marginal cost c:With demand q (p) ; aggregate consumer
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surplus under p (c) is
s (c)  S (p (c)) =
Z 1
p(c)
q (x) dx:
Thus, s0 (c) =  q (p (c)) p0 (c) and
s00 (c) =  q0 (p (c)) p0 (c)2   q (p (c)) p00 (c) :
Using the expressions for p0 (c) and p00 (c) from (11) and (12), we have s00 (c) > 0 if and
only if (A1) holds.
Second, consumer surplus under di¤erential pricing (S) and under uniform pricing ( S)
are ranked as follows:
S =
Z 1
pL
q (x) dx+
Z 1
pH
(1  ) q (x) dx
= s (cL) + (1  ) s (cH)
> s (cL + (1  ) cH) (by the convexity of s (c))
= S (p (c)) =
Z 1
p
q (x) dx
=
Z 1
p
q (x) dx+
Z 1
p
(1  ) q (x) dx = S:
We note that (A1) is a fairly tight su¢ cient condition for di¤erential pricing to raise
consumer welfare, in the sense that it is the necessary and su¢ cient condition for consumer
surplus as a function of constant marginal cost, s (c) ; to be strictly convex.11
Condition (A1) can be equivalently stated as  > p (c) p00 (c) = [p0 (c)]2 ; the assumption
on the pass-through rate made in Cowan (2012, p. 335).12 Cowan (2012) analyzes price
changes due to pure price discrimination as if there were counterfactual changes in marginal
11 If s00 (c) had a consistent sign over the relevant range of c; then (A1) would also be the necessary (and
su¢ cient) condition for di¤erential pricing to increase consumer welfare, but since in general s00 (c) may not
have a consistent sign, (A1) is su¢ cient but may not be necessary.
12This assumption is satised by numerous demand functions, including those for which the pass-through
rate is constant or decreasing.
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costs.13 Under the assumption on the pass-through rate or, equivalently, our (A1), he shows
that discriminatory pricing will increase aggregate consumer surplus if, evaluated at the
uniform price, the ratio of pass-through rate to price elasticity of demand is no lower in
market L than in H (Cowans Proposition 1(i)).14 This turns out to be a rather restrictive
condition. Cowan notes that The set of demand functions whose shape alone implies that
[consumer] surplus is higher with discrimination is small. The surprise, perhaps, is that it
is non-empty.15 Strikingly, when di¤erential pricing is motivated solely by di¤erent costs
instead of demand elasticities, our Proposition 2 shows that (A1) alone is su¢ cient to ensure
that di¤erential pricing will increase consumer welfare.16
Since Proposition 2 covers all demand functions with a constant pass-through rate, it in-
cludes proportional linear demands. Our Proposition 1, however, addressed linear demands
that may di¤er also in their elasticity parameter (aH > aL, whereas proportional demands
allow only the slope parameters bL and bH to di¤er).
Total welfare increases with di¤erential pricing more often than does consumer surplus
since welfare includes prots which necessarily rise. In fact, our welfare comparison will use
13The analogy holds because the monopolists uniform price p would be its optimal price for each market
if, counterfactually, it faced di¤erent costs in the two markets: bcH = MRH(qH( p)) < MRL(qL( p)) = bcL
instead of the common marginal cost c: Whereas under di¤erential pricing the monopolist sets prices based
on c and the di¤erent demand elasticities.
14 Intuitively, di¤ering elasticities create a bias for discrimination to raise the average price. In order to
o¤set this bias the demand curvatures must be such that the monopolist has a stronger incentive to cut
price in the market where its virtual marginal cost fell than to raise price in the other market.
15Specically, his su¢ cient condition for consumer surplus to rise is only satised by two demand functions:
logit demands with pass-through above one half and demand based on the Extreme Value distribution
(Cowan, pp. 340-1).
16The contrast between cost-based versus elasticity-based di¤erential pricing is also seen from Cowans
Proposition 1(ii) which provides su¢ cient conditions for consumer surplus to fall. One such case is concave
demands in both markets with the same pass-through rate (Cowan, p. 339). That case falls within our
Proposition 2, hence consumer surplus would increase when di¤erential pricing is motivated purely by
di¤erent costs.
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the following su¢ cient condition:
0 (q)    [3   (q)] [2   (q)]
q
; (A1)
where 3    (q) > 1 since 2    (q) > 0 from (11). Thus condition (A1) relaxes (A1).
Condition (A1) ensures that total welfare is a strictly convex function of marginal cost
(whereas (A1) ensured the same for consumer surplus), yielding the following result whose
proof is otherwise similar to that of Proposition 2 and therefore relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Assume qL (p) = q (p) and qH (p) = (1  ) q (p) for  2 (0; 1) : If (A1)
holds, di¤erential pricing increases total welfare.
In analyzing (pure) price discrimination, Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010, ACV) assume
an increasing ratio condition (IRC): z (p) = p c2 m strictly increases, where m  (p  c) =p.
ACV then show that price discrimination reduces welfare if the direct demand function in
the strong market (our H) is at least as convex as in the weak market at the uniform price
(ACV, Proposition 1). Since
z0 (p) =
2 m + (p  c)

d(m)
dp  +m
0 (q) q0

(2 m)2 ;
z0 (p) > 0 is equivalent to
0 (q) <
1
 q0

2 m
p  c +
d (m)
dp


1
m
;
which, provided d(m)dp =   [q
0+(p c)q00]q (p c)[q0]2
q2
 0; is satised if 0 (q) is not too positive.17
Therefore, the IRC condition in ACV and our (A1) both can be satised if  (q) neither
increases nor decreases too fast, which encompasses the important class of demand functions
with a constant : However, in contrast to price discrimination, for these demand functions
di¤erential pricing based purely on cost di¤erences will increase total welfare.
Under the IRC assumption, ACVs Proposition 2 shows that welfare is higher with dis-
crimination if the discriminatory prices are not far apart and the inverse demand function
17From ACV, condition z0 (p) > 0 holds for a large number of common demand functions, including
linear, constant-elasticity, and exponential. IRC neither implies nor is implied by our (A1).
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in the weak market is locally more convex than that in the strong market. However, our
Proposition 3 shows that di¤erential pricing motivated by cost di¤erences increases welfare
also for markets that have the same demand curvatures.
The remainder of this section further illustrates the channels by which di¤erential pricing
a¤ects overall welfare and consumer surplus. With cost di¤erences the output reallocation
e¤ect of di¤erential pricing can be positive for welfare, which is ensured if the margin under
di¤erential pricing is no lower in market L than in H (Remark 1). This condition is met
in the case of proportional demands if the pass-through rate does not exceed 1 over the
relevant cost range, because p0 (c)  1 implies pH  pL =
R cH
cL
p0 (c) dc  R cHcL dc = cH   cL.
(Conversely, pH   pL > cH   cL if p0 (c) > 1:)
Remark 3 With proportional demands the output reallocation e¤ect from di¤erential pric-
ing is positive if (but not only if) the pass-through rate does not exceed one over the range
of marginal costs in the two markets: p0 (c)  1 for c 2 [cL; cH ].
Given a pass-through rate not exceeding one, di¤erential pricing can be benecial even if
total output falls:
Example 1 (Di¤erential pricing reduces output but raises total welfare and consumer sur-
plus.) Suppose p = a bq; with q =  a pb 1= and  > 1: For c < a; we have p (c) = a  a c+1 ;
q (c) =

1
b
a c
+1
1=
; so q (c) is strictly concave when  > 1. Hence
q = (qL + q

H)  (qL + qH) = q (cL) + (1  ) q (cH)  q (cL + (1  ) cH) < 0;
so di¤erential pricing reduces total output. However, this demand function satises (A1).
Thus, di¤erential pricing increases consumer surplus and, hence, also total welfare. Con-
sumer surplus increases here because the weighted-average price is equal to the uniform
price (since p00 (c) = 0), but di¤erential pricing generates price dispersion which benets
consumers. Since total output falls the increase in welfare must come from the reallocation
e¤ect (recalling (8)). From Remark 3, the reallocation indeed is benecial since the pass-
through rate is less than one, p0 (c) = 1=( + 1), and in this case dominates the negative
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output e¤ect.18
For proportional demands, although unusual, it is possible to nd cases where (A1) does
not hold and di¤erential pricing reduces consumer surplus, as in the example below. (A
second example is in the Appendix .) We have not been able, however, to nd examples
where di¤erential pricing under pure cost di¤erences reduces total welfare.
Example 2 (Di¤erential pricing reduces consumer surplus: logit demand.) Assume cL = 0;
cH = 0:5;  = 1=2; and logit demand
qL =
1
1 + ep a
= qH ; pL = a  ln q
1  q = p
H :
Let a = 8: Then pL = 6: 327; p

H = 6: 409; p = 6: 367 ; q

L = 0:842; q

H = 0:831; q = 0:837:
Di¤erential pricing in this case raises average price and lowers total output: It reduces
consumer welfare: S =  8: 59  10 4; but total welfare increases: W = 4: 87  10 4:
Notice that in this example, (A1) is violated when q > 0:5; but (A1) is satised for q < 1
(which is always true).
5. GENERAL DEMANDS
When demand is linear in both markets Proposition 1 showed that if the cost di¤erence
is su¢ ciently large relative to the demand di¤erence, di¤erential pricing will increase both
total welfare and consumer surplus. It is not obvious that this result extends to general
demands, because as the cost di¤erence grows the average price under di¤erential pricing
may rise faster than that under uniform pricing (as shown later in Example 3). To address
the mixed case where there are di¤erences both in general demand functions and in costs
we develop an alternative analytical approach that more clearly disentangles their roles,
and use it to derive a su¢ cient condition for di¤erential pricing to raise consumer surplus,
hence also total welfare.
18The reallocation is benecial for any  > 0: If   1 (instead of > 1 as assumed thus far), then di¤erential
pricing would not lower total output, and the two e¤ects would reinforce each other to increase total welfare.
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Without loss of generality, let
cH = c+ t; cL = c  t:
Then, cH   cL = 2t; which increases in t; and cH = cL when t = 0. Thus, c is the average
of the marginal costs and t measures the cost di¤erential. For i = H;L; the monopoly price
under di¤erential pricing pi (t) satises i0 (pi (t)) = 0 or
qi (pi (t)) + [pi (t)  ci] qi0 (pi (t)) = 0: (14)
Dene the monopoly price in each market when there is no cost di¤erence as p0i  pi (0) ;
and dene qi (t) = qi (pi (t)) :
From (14), using cH = c+ t; we have
p0H (t) =
qH0 (pH (t))
H00 (pH (t))
=
1
2 + [pH(t) cH ]pH(t) pH (t)
qH00(pH(t))
qH0(pH(t))
:
Using the denitions of ; ; and ; recalling that p
(c) c
p(c) =
1
(p(c)) , and noticing that
dcL=dt =  dcH=dt =  1; we have
p0H (t) =
1
2  H (qH (t)) > 0; p
0
L (t) =  
1
2  L (qL (t)) < 0; (15)
where 2  i (qi (t)) > 0 from (11).
Let p (t) be the monopoly uniform price, which solves
qH (p (t)) + [p (t)  c  t] qH0 (p (t)) + qL (p (t)) + [p (t)  c+ t] qL0 (p (t)) = 0:
Then
p0 (t) =   q
L0 (p (t))  qH0 (p (t))
H00 (p (t)) + L00 (p (t))
: (16)
Since the denominator is negative, sign p0 (t) = sign [qL0 (p (t)) qH0 (p (t))]. Thus, p0 (t) > 0
if at the initial uniform price the demand function qL is less price sensitive (steeper) than
is qH . Intuitively, an increase in the cost di¤erence t gives the monopolist an incentive to
raise the output-mix ratio qL=qH . This requires increasing the uniform price, hence reducing
total output, if qL is steeper than qH , and lowering price if qH is steeper.
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Dene
i (q)  q
2  i (q) : (17)
Then i0 (q) > 0 for i = H;L if and only if (A1) holds.
Using (1), we have
S0 (t)  S0 (t)  S0 (t)
=  qL (pL (t)) p0L (t)  qH (pH (t)) p0H (t) +

qL (p (t)) p0 (t) + qH (p (t)) p0 (t)

:
Consumer welfare will increase faster under di¤erential than under uniform pricing with a
marginal increase in t if S0 (t) > 0; and, for any given t > 0; consumer welfare will be
higher under di¤erential pricing if S (t) > 0.
Using (15) and (16), we can write S0 (t) as
S0 (t) = L
 
qL (pL (t))
 H  qH (pH (t)) qL (p (t)) + qH (p (t)) qL0 (p (t))  qH0 (p (t))
H00 (p (t)) + L00 (p (t))
:
(18)
Proposition 4 Under (A1), if (i) qL0 (p (t))  qH0 (p (t)) ; (ii) L  qL (pL (1))  H  qH (pH (1))
for su¢ ciently small 1  0; and (iii) S (0)   2 for su¢ ciently small 2  0; then there
exists some t^  0; with t^ = 0 if 1 = 2 = 0; such that when t > t^, consumer surplus and
total welfare are higher under di¤erential pricing than under uniform pricing.
Proof. From (18), when (i) holds; S0 (t)  L  qL (pL (t))   H  qH (pH (t))  S0 (t) :
Since p0L (t) < 0 and p
0
H (t) > 0; we have
S00 (t) = L0
 
qL (pL (t))

qL0 (pL (t)) p0L (t)  H0
 
qH (pH (t))

qH0 (pH (t)) p0H (t) > 0;
where i0
 
qL (pL (t))

> 0 by (A1). Hence S0 (t) is strictly increasing. Then, from (ii),
S0 (t) > 0 for t > 1: Therefore, if 1 = 2 = 0; we have S (0)  0; S0 (0)  0; and
S0 (t) = L
 
qL (pL (t))
 H  qH (pH (t)) > 0 for all t > 0: It follows that S (t) > 0 for
all t > 0; or t^ = 0:
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Next suppose that i > 0 for at least one i: We can x some t^ > 0 such that when t > t^
and 1 < t^=2:
S (t) =
Z t
0
S0 (x) dx+S (0) =
Z 1
0
S0 (x) dx+
Z t
1
S0 (x) dx+S (0)

Z 1
0
S0 (x) dx+
Z t^=2
1
S0 (x) dx+
Z t^
t^=2
S0 (x) dx+S (0)
> S0 (0) 1 + S0

t^
2

t^
2
  2
> 0 when 1 and 2 are small enough:
Finally, total welfare is also higher since W (t)  S (t) :
The su¢ cient conditions for di¤erential pricing to benet consumers under general de-
mands include (A1), as with proportional demands, and three additional conditions whose
roles are as follows. Condition (i) requires that qL (p) be at least as steep as qH (p) at the
uniform price (p (t)): This ensures that under uniform pricing a marginal increase in t does
not reduce price, hence does not increase consumers surplus. Condition (ii) ensures that a
marginal increase in t increases consumer surplus under di¤erential pricing at some small t,
and (A1) further ensures that consumer surplus will increase at an increasing rate. Hence,
if consumer welfare is not too much lower under di¤erential than under uniform pricing
when there is no cost di¤erence, which is ensured by (iii), consumer welfare will be higher
under di¤erential pricing if the cost di¤erence is su¢ ciently high.
The conditions for Proposition 4 can be satised in many plausible situations, even when
pure price discrimination (cH = cL) would reduce consumer welfare, as in many of the
cases identied in Proposition 1 of ACV. For instance, the linear demands case of Section
3 is covered by Proposition 4.19 Also, if demands are proportional, qL (p) = q (p) and
qH (p) = (1  ) q (p), then for   1=2 (market L is at least as large as H) one can verify
19Recall that qH = aH p
b
and qL =
aL p
b
; with aH > aL: Then, both (A1) and (i) are satised, with
pH (t) =
aH+c+t
2
; and pL (t) =
aL+c t
2
: Furthermore, both (ii) and (iii) hold for 1 =
aH aL
2
and 2 =
(aH aL)
8
: Thus, if t > t^ = 3
2
(aH   aL) implying (cH   cL) > 3 (aH   aL) ; the condition in part (ii) of
Proposition 1 then di¤erential pricing increases consumer and total welfare, even though for linear demands
pure price discrimination reduces consumer welfare.
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that conditions (i)-(iii) are all satised with 1 = 2 = 0; so that under (A1) di¤erential
pricing increases consumer and total welfare.20
The next example shows that if the conditions in Proposition 4 are not met, then dif-
ferential pricing can reduce total welfare (hence also consumer surplus) even as cH   cL
becomes arbitrarily large (subject to the constraint that both markets will still be served
under uniform pricing).
Example 3 (Di¤erential pricing reduces welfare for any cost di¤erence.) Suppose that
cL = 0; cH 2 (0; 0:539] and demands are
qL = 2 (1  p) ; qH = e 2p; pH =  1
2
ln q:
Then, both markets are served under uniform pricing if and only if cH  0:539; and pL = 0:5;
pH (c) = 0:5+cH : Notice that condition (i) in Proposition 4 is violated here since p (t)  0:5
and
qL0 (p) =  1 < qH0 (p) =  2e 2p for all p  0:5:
Thus, under uniform pricing p would fall as the cost di¤erence rises if average cost were kept
constant. This force causes total welfare to be lower under di¤erential than under uniform
pricing in this example over the entire range of cost di¤erences for which both markets are
served. Table 1 illustrates this, where for convenience we have xed cL = 0 and considered
increasing values of cH (so that p increases, but less so than (pL + p

H) =2; as average cost
rises):
Table 1: cL = 0; p

L = 0:5; p

H = 0:5 + cH ; q = q
   q
cH 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.539
p 0:515 1 0:529 6 0:543 3 0:556 5 0:5691 0:573 9
pL+p

H
2 0:5500 0:6000 0:6500 0:7000 0:7500 0:769 5
q  0:0255  0:0409  0:0489  0:0503  0:0469  0:044
W  0:010  0:011  0:004  0:044  0:03 7  0:034
20However, conditions (i)-(iii) are su¢ cient but not necessary since Proposition 2 showed that with pro-
portional demands di¤erential pricing increases consumer and social welfare under (A1) for all  2 (0; 1) :
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Interestingly, in Example 3 the allocation of output is e¢ cient under di¤erential pricing
(and not under uniform), since the markups are equal in the two markets: pH   cH =
pL   cL = 0:5. However, average price under di¤erential pricing (0:5 + cH=2) exceeds the
uniform price p for all values of cH and output is lower, which reduces welfare despite the
improved allocation. By contrast, di¤erential pricing improved welfare in Example 1 that
exhibited pure cost di¤erences, even though output fell there as well (but average price
under di¤erential pricing equaled the uniform price for all cost values there). The added
incentive to raise average price under di¤erential pricing due to demand di¤erences causes
a stronger negative output e¤ect here that outweighs the improved allocation.
The analysis in ACV uses the approach that varies the constraint pH   pL  r; where r
is the price di¤erence allowed. Proposition 2 in ACV gives a su¢ cient condition for price
discrimination to increase total welfare, which can be satised only if inverse demand in
the weak market is more convex than that in the strong market at the discriminatory prices
and these prices are close to each other (ACV, p. 1606). Letting
zi (p)  (p  ci)
2 mi (p)i (p) ; (19)
where mi (p)  p cip is the proportional price-cost margin (the Lerner index) and i (p) =
 pqi00(p)
qi0(p) ; we can extend ACVs Proposition 2 straightforwardly to our more general case
where costs as well demands di¤er.
Remark 4 Assume z0i (p) > 0: If in addition
pL   cL
2  L  qL  p

H   cH
2  H  qH ; (20)
then di¤erential pricing increases total welfare.
Since pL < p

H , if costs are equal as in ACV, condition (20) can only be met if 
L (qL) >
H (qH): at the discriminatory prices, inverse demand is more convex in the weak market,
which is needed for price discrimination to increase total output. This curvature condition,
however, is not required for di¤erential pricing to increase welfare when costs di¤er, since
di¤erential pricing can easily induce pL   cL > pH   cH ; i.e., a positive reallocation e¤ect
in the strong sense relative to uniform pricing.
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6. CONCLUSION
Prevailing economic analysis of third-degree price discrimination by a monopolist paints
an ambivalent picture of its welfare e¤ects relative to uniform pricing. In order for overall
welfare to rise total output must expand, and without specic knowledge of the shapes
of demand curves the literature yields no presumption about the change in output unless
discrimination leads the rm to serve additional markets. Moreover, since discrimination
raises prots, an increase in overall welfare is necessary but not su¢ cient for aggregate
consumer surplus to rise.
This paper showed that judging di¤erential pricing through the lens of pure price dis-
crimination understates its benecial role when price di¤erences are motivated at least in
part by di¤erences in the costs of serving various markets. Di¤erential pricing then saves
costs by reallocating output to lower-cost markets, and can easily benet consumers in the
aggregate by creating price dispersion which unlike pure price discrimination does not
come with a systematic bias for average price to rise.
One policy application involves the common and growing practice of add-on pricing or
unbundling the pricing of various elements from the base good. This is sometimes decried as
harmful to consumers based, perhaps implicitly, on a price discrimination view. Our analysis
casts add-on pricing in a considerably more benign light when the add-on services entail
signicant incremental costs. A potential extension would be to analyze whether/how the
benecial aspects of di¤erential pricing under di¤erent costs might extend beyond monopoly
to imperfect competition, building on the analyses of oligopoly price discrimination (e.g.,
Holmes 1989 and Stole 2007).
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APPENDIX
Example 4 (Di¤erential pricing reduces consumer surplus: concave demands over the rel-
evant range.) Suppose that cL = 0; cH = 0:2; and
pL = (1  ln (q=10)) 14 = pH ; qL = 10e(1 p4) = qH :
Then pL = 0:707 11; p

H = 0:762 94; p = 0:733 5; q

L = 21: 170; q

H = 19:37 1; q = 20: 351.
(A1) is violated for q since
0 (q) <   [2   (q)]
q
if q > 15:392:
S =  0:037; hence aggregate consumer welfare is lower due to di¤erential pricing. Here,
the rise in the average price due to di¤erential pricing, p

L+p

H
2 = 0:735 03 > p; outweighs the
consumer benets from price dispersion. Total output falls: qL+q

H = 40:541 < 2q = 40:702:
However, total welfare is still higher under di¤erential pricing: W = 0:053 > 0:
Proof of Proposition 3. First, we show that under (A1), total welfare is a strictly
convex function of constant marginal cost c: Total welfare under p (c) is
w (c) W (p (c)) =
Z q(p(c))
0
[p (x)  c] dx:
Thus
w0 (c) = [p (c)  c] q0 (p (c)) p0 (c)  q (p (c)) :
From the rst-order condition for p (c) ; we have [p (c)  c] q0 (p (c)) =  q (p (c)) : Hence
w0 (c) =  q (p (c)) p0 (c)  q (p (c)) =  q (p (c)) p0 (c) + 1 :
It follows that
w00 (c) =  q0 (p (c)) p0 (c)

1
2   (q) + 1

  q (p (c)) 
0 (q)
[2   (q)]2 q
0 (p) p0 (c) :
Therefore, w00 (c) > 0 if
3   (q) + q (p (c)) 
0 (q)
2   (q) > 0;
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or if (A1) holds.
Next,
W  = 
Z q(p(cL))
0
[p (x)  cL] dx+ (1  )
Z q(p(cH))
0
[p (x)  cH ] dx
= w (cL) + (1  )w (cH)
> w (cL + (1  ) cH) (by the convexity of w (c))
=
Z q(p(c))
0
[p (x)  c] dx
= 
Z q(p)
0
[p (x)  cL] dx+ (1  )
Z q(p)
0
[p (x)  cH ] dx = W:
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